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Abstract—Optimum decision fusion in the presence of mali-
cious nodes - often referred to as Byzantines - is hindered by the
necessity of exactly knowing the statistical behavior of Byzantines.
By focusing on a simple, yet widely studied, set-up in which a
Fusion Center (FC) is asked to make a binary decision about a
sequence of system states by relying on the possibly corrupted
decisions provided by local nodes, we propose a game-theoretic
framework which permits to exploit the superior performance
provided by optimum decision fusion, while limiting the amount
of a-priori knowledge required. We first derive the optimum
decision strategy by assuming that the statistical behavior of
the Byzantines is known. Then we relax such an assumption by
casting the problem into a game-theoretic framework in which
the FC tries to guess the behavior of the Byzantines, which,
in turn, must fix their corruption strategy without knowing
the guess made by the FC. We use numerical simulations to
derive the equilibrium of the game, thus identifying the optimum
behavior for both the FC and the Byzantines, and to evaluate the
achievable performance at the equilibrium. We analyze several
different setups, showing that in all cases the proposed solution
permits to improve the accuracy of data fusion. We also show
that, in some instances, it is preferable for the Byzantines to
minimize the mutual information between the status of the
observed system and the reports submitted to the FC, rather
than always flipping the decision made by the local nodes as it
is customarily assumed in previous works.
Index Terms—Adversarial signal processing, byzantine nodes,
distributed detection with corrupted reports, data fusion, data
fusion in malicious settings, game theory, dynamic programming.
I. INTRODUCTION
Decision fusion for distributed detection in the presence
of malicious nodes, often referred to as Byzantines [1], has
received an increasing attention for its importance in several
application scenarios, including wireless sensor networks [2],
[3], cognitive radio [4]–[7], distributed detection [8], [9],
multimedia forensics [10] and many others.
The most commonly studied scenario is the parallel dis-
tributed data fusion model. According to such a model, the
n nodes of a multi-sensor network collect information about
a system through the observation vectors x1,x2 . . .xn. Based
on the observation vectors, the nodes compute n reports and
send them to a Fusion Center (FC). The fusion center gathers
the local reports and makes a final decision about the state of
the system. In the setup considered in this paper, the state of
the system is represented by a sequence sm = (s1, s2 . . . sm).
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The m components of sm may correspond to the state of the
system at different time instants or to several characteristics
of a complex system. Spectrum sensing in cognitive radio
networks is a typical example of the above scenario: the
observed system is the frequency spectrum of a primary
communication network, while sm may correspond to the state
of the spectrum (busy or idle) at different time instants, or
to the state of different frequency channels. An additional
example is provided by online reputation systems. In such
systems, the FC must compute the global rating of a good or
a service by relying on the feedback and ratings coming from
users, whom, in turn, could be interested to provide a biased
feedback in order to increase or decrease the reputation of an
item [11].
Hereafter we assume that each component of sm can take
only two values (si ∈ {0, 1}). Additionally, we make the
simplifying assumption that the reports correspond to local
decisions made by the nodes about the system state. Specifi-
cally, we indicate by rij ∈ {0, 1}, i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . .m the
report sent by node i regarding the j-th component of sm.
Decision fusion must be carried out in an adversarial setting,
that is by taking into account the possibility that some of the
nodes malevolently alter their reports to induce a decision
error. This is a recurrent situation in many scenarios where
a decision error results in a profit for the nodes (see [1] for a
general introduction to this topic). To be specific, we assume
that the nodes do not know the exact state of the system, so
they estimate it based on the observation vectors xi’s. Let us
denote with uij the binary decision made by node i regarding
the j-th component of sm. While for honest nodes rij = uij ,
malicious nodes flip uij with a certain probability Pmal, so that
uij 6= rij with probability Pmal. Hereafter, we assume that the
same probability Pmal is used by all malicious nodes and for
all the components of sm, that is Pmal does not depend either
on i1 or j. A pictorial representation of the setup analyzed in
this paper is given in Figure 1.
A. Prior work
In a simplified and well studied version of the problem, the
FC makes its decision on sj by looking only at the corre-
sponding reports, i.e. (r1,j , r2,j . . . rn,j). This is a reasonable
assumption in some applications, e.g., when the components
of sm correspond to the state of the observed system at
different time instants, and a decision must be made as soon
1Of course, assuming that the i-th node is a Byzantine, otherwise we
obviously have Pmal = 0.
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Fig. 1: Sketch of the adversarial decision fusion scheme.
as the reports regarding the state at time j are available. In
the absence of Byzantines, the optimum way to combine the
local decisions according to the Bayesian approach has been
determined in [12], [13], and is known as Chair-Varshney rule.
If local error probabilities are symmetric and equal across the
nodes, Chair-Varshney rule corresponds to simple majority-
bases decision.
When Byzantines are present, the application of Chair-
Varshney rule requires that the position of the byzantine nodes
is known, along with the flipping probability Pmal, an infor-
mation that is rarely available, thus forcing the FC to adopt
suboptimal fusion strategies. In [8], decision fusion is framed
into a Neyman-Pearson setup and the asymptotic performance
of the system when the number of nodes tends to infinity are
analyzed as a function of the percentage of corrupted reports.
As a result, the fraction of Byzantines impeding any correct
decision is determined. Another noticeable aspect of [8] is
that the Byzantines are assumed to cooperate among them to
infer the exact status of the system and corrupt their reports
accordingly. The analysis carried out in [8] is extended in
[5], where the interplay between the strategy adopted by the
Byzantines to attack the system and the fusion rule adopted
by FC together with the local decision strategy used by honest
nodes is modeled as a zero sum game, whose payoff is either
the overall error probability or the divergence between the
probability mass function (pmf) of the observed reports under
the hypothesis that s = 0 and s = 1. Even in [5], the authors
determine the minimum fraction of Byzantines impeding any
correct decision with both cooperative and noncooperative
Byzantines.
Better results can be obtained if the FC collects all the
reports and estimate the state vector as a whole. In a cognitive
radio scenario, for instance, this corresponds to decide about
spectrum occupancy over an entire time window, or, more
realistically, to jointly decide about the state of the spectrum
at different frequency slots. As an example, the FC may try to
identify the malicious nodes by measuring the similarity (or
dissimilarity) between the submitted reports and use such an
estimate to ignore the reports coming from suspect nodes in the
decision fusion process. Such an approach, which is usually
referred to as Byzantine isolation [1], is adopted in [5]. Ac-
cording to such a work, all the components of the state vector
are analyzed to assign to each node a reputation measure which
is eventually used to isolate the byzantine nodes, which are
identified as the nodes with a low reputation. A different iso-
lation scheme based on adaptive learning is described in [14],
where the observed behavior of the nodes is compared with
the expected behavior of honest nodes. A peculiarity of this
scheme is that it works even when the majority of the nodes
are byzantine, but it requires very long state vectors to achieve
good performances. Better performance can be obtained if
some additional knowledge about the Byzantine behavior is
available, as in [15], where the knowledge about Pmal and
the number of Byzantines in the networks is exploited to
develop a soft isolation scheme. As in [16], a game theoretic
approach is used to determine the optimum strategies for the
Byzantines and the FC. This corresponds to determining the
optimum value of Pmal for the Byzantines and the value of
some internal parameters of the isolation scheme for the FC.
As in that work, it turns out that setting Pmal = 1 is a
dominant strategy for the Byzantines. Tolerant schemes which
mitigate the impact of Byzantines in the decision, instead of
removing them, have also been proposed, like in [17], where
the reports are weighted differently according to the reputation
score of the nodes.
B. Contribution
Our research starts from the observation that the knowledge
of Pmal and the probability distribution of Byzantines across
the network would allow the derivation of the optimum deci-
sion fusion rule, thus permitting to the FC to obtain the best
achievable performance. We also argue that in the presence
of such an information discarding the reports received from
suspect nodes is not necessarily the optimum strategy, since
such reports may still convey some useful information about
the status of the system. This is the case, for instance, when
Pmal = 1. If the FC knows the identity of byzantine nodes, in
fact, it only needs to flip the reports received from such nodes
to cancel the Byzantines’ attack. In this sense, the method
proposed in [15] is highly suboptimal, since it does not fully
exploit the knowledge of Byzantine distribution and Pmal.
As a first contribution, we derive the optimum decision fu-
sion rule when the FC knows both the probability distribution
of Byzantines and Pmal. Our analysis goes along a line which
is similar to that used in [12] to derive the Chair-Varshney
optimal fusion rule. As a matter of fact, by knowing Pmal
and assuming that the probability that a node is Byzantine is
fixed and independent on the other nodes, the Chair-Varshney
rule can be easily extended to take into account the presence
of Byzantines. In contrast to [12], however, the optimal fusion
rule we derive in this paper, makes a joint decision on the
whole sequence of states hence permitting to improve the
decision accuracy. In addition, the analysis is not limited to the
case of independently distributed Byzantines. As an additional
contribution, we describe an efficient implementation of the
optimum fusion strategy based on dynamic programming.
3Starting from the optimum decision fusion rule, the second
contribution of this work focuses on the a-priori knowledge
required to implement the optimum rule, namely Pmal and the
distribution of Byzantines across the network. In order to cope
with the lack of knowledge regarding Pmal, we introduce a
game-theoretic approach according to which the FC arbitrarily
sets the value of Pmal to a guessed value PFCmal and uses such
a value within the optimum fusion rule. At the same time,
the Byzantines choose the value of Pmal so to maximize the
error probability, without knowing the value of PFCmal used by
the fusion center. The payoff is defined as the overall error
probability, with the FC aiming at minimizing it, while the
goal of the Byzantines is to maximize it. Having defined the
game, we use numerical simulations to derive the existence of
equilibrium points, which then identify the optimum behavior
for both the FC and the Byzantines in a game-theoretic sense.
While the adoption of a game-theoretic framework to model
decision fusion in the presence of Byzantines has been used
before, its adoption as an alternative to optimum decision
fusion in the absence of precise information about Byzantines
behavior is a novel contribution of this work. With regard
to the knowledge that the FC has about the distribution
of Byzantines, we consider several cases, ranging from a
maximum entropy scenario in which the uncertainty about
the distribution of Byzantines is maximum, through a more
favorable situation in which the FC knows the exact number
of Byzantines present in the network.
As a last contribution, we use numerical simulations to get
more insights into the optimum strategies at the equilibrium
and the achievable performance under various settings. The
simulations show that in all the analyzed cases, the perfor-
mance at the equilibrium outperform those obtained in pre-
vious works (specifically in [5], [15]). Simulation results also
confirm the intuition that, in some instances, it is preferable for
the Byzantines to minimize the mutual information between
the status of the observed system and the reports submitted
to the FC, rather than always flipping the decision made by
the local nodes as it is often assumed in previous works. This
is especially true when the length of the observed sequence
and the available information about the Byzantine distribution
allow a good identification of byzantine nodes.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we derive the optimum fusion rule under different assumptions
on the distribution of Byzantines. In Section III, we propose
an efficient implementation of the optimum fusion rule based
on dynamic programming. In Section IV, we introduce the
game-theoretic framework modeling the interplay between the
Byzantines and the FC. In Section V, we present simulations
results and discuss optimum attacking and fusion strategies in
various settings. We conclude the paper in Section VI with
some final remarks.
II. OPTIMUM FUSION RULE
In the rest of the paper, we will use capital letters to denote
random variables and lowercase letters for their instantiations.
Given a random variable X , we indicate with PX(x) its prob-
ability mass function (pmf). Whenever the random variable
the pmf refers to is clear from the context, we will use the
notation P (x) as a shorthand for PX(x).
With the above notation in mind, we let Sm =
(S1, S2 . . . Sm) indicate a sequence of independent and identi-
cally distributed (i.i.d.) random variables indicating the state of
the system. We assume that all states are equiprobable, that is
PSj (0) = PSj (1) = 0.5. We denote by Uij ∈ {0, 1} the local
decision made by node i about Sj . We exclude any interaction
between the nodes and assume that Uij’s are conditionally
independent for a fixed status of the system. This is equivalent
to assuming that the local decision errors are i.i.d.
With regard to the position of the Byzantines, let An =
(A1 . . . An) be a binary random sequence in which Ai = 0
(res. Ai = 1) if node i is honest (res. byzantine). The
probability that the distribution of Byzantines across the nodes
is an is indicated by PAn(an) or simply P (an).
Finally, we let R = {Rij}, i = 1 . . . n, j = 1 . . .m
be a random matrix with all the reports received by the
fusion center, accordingly, we denote by r = {rij} a specific
instantiation of R. As stated before, Rij = Uij for honest
nodes, while P (Rij 6= Uij) = Pmal for byzantine nodes.
Byzantine nodes flip the local decisions Uij independently of
each other with equal probabilities, so that their action can
be modeled as a number of independent binary symmetric
channels with crossover probability Pmal.
We are now ready to derive the optimum decision rule at the
FC. Given the received reports r and by adopting a maximum
a posteriori probability criterion, the optimum decision rule
minimizing the error probability Pe can be written as:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
P (sm|r). (1)
By applying Bayes rule and exploiting the fact that all state
sequences are equiprobable we obtain:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
P (r|sm). (2)
In order to go on, we condition P (r|sm) to the knowledge of
an and then average over all possible an:
sm,∗ =argmax
sm
∑
an
P (r|an, sm)P (an) (3)
=argmax
sm
∑
an
( n∏
i=1
P (ri|ai, sm)
)
P (an) (4)
=argmax
sm
∑
an
( n∏
i=1
m∏
j=1
P (rij |ai, sj)
)
P (an), (5)
where ri indicates the i-th row of r. In (4) we exploited
the fact that, given an and sm, the reports sent by the nodes
are independent of each other, while (5) derives from the
observation that each report depends only on the corresponding
element of the state sequence.
We now consider the case in which the probability of a
local decision error, say ε, is the same regardless of the system
status, that is ε = Pr(Uij 6= Sj |Sj = sj), sj = 0, 1. For a
honest node, such a probability corresponds to the probability
that the report received by the FC does not correspond to the
system status. This is not the case for byzantine nodes, for
4which the probability δ that the FC receives a wrong report is
δ = ε(1− Pmal) + (1− ε)Pmal.
According to the above setting, the nodes can be modeled
as binary symmetric channels, whose input corresponds to the
system status and for which the crossover probability is equal
to ε for the honest nodes and δ for the Byzantines. With regard
to ε, it is reasonable to assume that such a value is known
to the fusion center, since it depends on the characteristics
of the channel through which the nodes observe the system
and the local decision rule adopted by the nodes. The value
of δ depends on the value of Pmal which is chosen by the
Byzantines and then is not generally known to the FC. As
we outlined in Section I-B, we will first derive the optimum
fusion rule assuming that Pmal is known and then relax
this assumption by modeling the problem in a game-theoretic
framework (see Section IV).
From (5), the optimum decision rule can be written:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
∑
an
( ∏
i:ai=0
(1− ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i) (6)
∏
i:ai=1
(1− δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i)
)
P (an),
where meq(i) is the number of j’s for which rij = sj . To go
on we need to make some assumptions on the distribution of
Byzantines P (an).
A. Unconstrained maximum entropy distribution
As a worst case situation, we may consider that the FC has
no a-priori information about the distribution of Byzantines.
This corresponds to maximizing the entropy of An, i.e. to
assuming that all sequences an are equiprobable, P (an) =
1/2n. In this case, the random variables Ai are independent
of each other and we have PAi(0) = PAi(1) = 1/2. It is
easy to argue that in this case the Byzantines may impede
any meaningful decision at the FC. To see why, let us assume
that the Byzantines decide to use Pmal = 1. With this choice,
the mutual information between the vector state Sm and R
is zero and so any decision made by the FC center would be
equivalent to guessing the state of the system by flipping a
coin. The above observation is consistent with previous works
in which it is usually assumed that the probability that a node
is Byzantine or the overall fraction of Byzantines is lower than
0.5, since otherwise the Byzantines would always succeed to
blind the FC [1].
B. Constrained maximum entropy distributions
A second possibility consists in maximizing the entropy of
An subject to a constraint which corresponds to the a-priori
information available to the fusions center. We consider two
cases. In the first one the FC knows the expected value of the
number of Byzantines present in the network, in the second
case, the FC knows only that the number of Byzantines is
lower than n/2. In the following, we let NB indicate the
number of Byzantines present in the network.
1) Maximum entropy for a given E[NB ]: Let α =
E[NB ]/n indicate the fraction of Byzantines nodes in the
network. In order to determine the distribution P (an) which
maximizes H(An) subject to α, we observe that E[NB ] =
E[
∑
iAi] =
∑
iE[Ai] =
∑
i µAi , where µAi indicates the
expected value of Ai. In order to determine the maximum
entropy distribution constrained to E[NB ] = αn, we need to
solve the following problem:
max
P (an):
∑
i µAi=nα
H(An). (7)
We now show that the solution to the above maximization
problem is obtained by letting the Ai’s to be i.i.d. random
variables with µAi = α. We have:
H(An) ≤
∑
i
H(Ai) =
∑
i
h(µAi), (8)
where h(µAi) denotes the binary entropy function
2 and where
the last equality derives from the observation that for a binary
random variable A, µA = PA(1). We also observe that
equality holds if and only if the random variables Ai’s are
independent. To maximize the rightmost term in equation (8)
subject to
∑
i µAi = nα, we observe that the binary entropy is
a concave function [18], and hence the maximum of the sum
is obtained when all µAi ’s are equal, that is when µAi = α.
In summary, the maximum entropy case with known average
number of Byzantines, corresponds to assuming i.i.d. node
states for which the probability of being malicious is constant
and known to the FC3. We also observe that when α = 0.5, we
go back to the unconstrained maximum entropy case discussed
in the previous section.
Let us assume, then, that Ai’s are Bernoulli random vari-
ables with parameter α, i,.e., PAi(1) = α, ∀i. In this
way, the number of Byzantines in the network is a random
variable with a binomial distribution. In particular, we have
P (an) =
∏
i P (ai), and hence (4) can be rewritten as:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
∑
an
( n∏
i=1
P (ri|ai, sm)P (ai)
)
. (9)
The expression in round brackets corresponds to a factoriza-
tion of P (r, an|sm). If we look at that expression as a function
of an, it is a product of marginal functions. By exploiting the
distributivity of the product with respect to the sum we can
rewrite (9) as follows
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
n∏
i=1
( ∑
ai∈{0,1}
P (ri|ai, sm)P (ai)
)
, (10)
which can be computed more efficiently, especially for large
n. The expression in (10) can also be derived directly from
(2) by exploiting first the independence of the reports and then
applying the law of total probability. By reasoning as we did
to derive (6), the to-be-maximized expression for the case of
2For any p ≤ 1 we have: h(p) = p log2 p+ (1− p) log2(1− p).
3Sometimes this scenario is referred to as Clairvoyant case [5].
5symmetric error probabilities at the nodes becomes
sm,∗ =argmax
sm
n∏
i=1
[
(1− α)(1− ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i)
+α(1− δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i)
]
.
(11)
Due to the independence of node states, the complexity of
the above maximization problem grows only linearly with n,
while it is exponential with respect to m, since it requires
the evaluation of the to-be-minimized function for all possible
sequence sm. For this reason, the optimal fusion strategy can
be adopted only when the length of the state sequence is
limited.
2) Maximum entropy with NB < n/2: As a second possi-
bility, we assume that the FC knows only that the number of
Byzantines is lower than n/2. As already observed in previous
works [1], [5], [19], and as it is easily arguable, when the
number of Byzantines exceeds the number of honest nodes no
meaningful decision can be made. Then it makes sense for the
FC to assume that NB < n/2, since if this is not the case, no
correct decision can be made anyhow. Under this assumption,
the maximum entropy distribution is the one which assigns
exactly the same probability to all the sequences an for which∑
i ai < n/2. To derive the optimum decision fusion strategy
in this setting, let I be the indexing set {1, 2, ..., n}. We denote
with Ik the set of all the possible k-subsets of I. Let I ∈ Ik
be a random variable with the indexes of the byzantine nodes,
a node i being byzantine if i ∈ I , honest otherwise. We this
notation, we can rewrite (3) as
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
bn/2c∑
k=0
∑
I∈Ik
P (r|I, sm)p(sm), (12)
where we have omitted the term P (I) (or equivalently P (am))
since all the sequences for which NB < n/2 have the same
probability. In the case of symmetric local error probabilities,
(12) takes the following form:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
bn/2c∑
k=0
∑
I∈Ik
(∏
i∈I
(1− δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i)
∏
i∈I\I
(1− ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i)
)
. (13)
A problem with (13) is the complexity of the inner summation,
which grows exponentially with n (especially for values of k
close to n/2). Together with the maximization over all possible
sm, this results in a doubly exponential complexity, making
the direct implementation of (13) problematic. In Section
III, we introduce an efficient algorithm based on dynamic
programming which reduces the computational complexity of
the maximization in (13).
We conclude by stressing an important difference between
the case considered in this subsection and the maximum
entropy case with fixed E[NB ]. On one hand, the average
number of Byzantines in the fixed average case may be lower
than in the present case. On the other hand, such a setting,
does not guarantee that the number of Byzantines is always
lower than the number of honest nodes, as in the case analyzed
in this subsection. This observation will be crucial to explain
some of the results that we will present later on in the paper.
C. Fixed number of Byzantines
The final setting we are going to analyze assumes that
the fusion center knows the exact number of Byzantines, say
nB . This is a more favorable situation with respect to those
addressed so far. The derivation of the optimum decision
fusion rule stems from the observation that, in this case,
P (an) 6= 0 only for the sequence for which ∑i ai = nB .
For such sequences, P (an) is constant and equal to
(
n
nB
)−1
.
By using the same notation used in the previous section, the
optimum fusion rules, then, is:
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
∑
I∈InB
P (r|I, sm)p(sm), (14)
which reduces to
sm,∗ = argmax
sm
∑
I∈InB
(∏
i∈I
(1− δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i)
∏
i∈I\I
(1− ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i)
)
, (15)
in the case of equal local error probabilities. With regard
to computational complexity, even if the summation over
all possible number of Byzantines is no more present, the
direct implementation of (15) is still very complex due to the
exponential dependence of the cardinality of InB with respect
to n.
III. AN EFFICIENT IMPLEMENTATION BASED ON DYNAMIC
PROGRAMMING
The computational complexity of a direct implementation of
(13) and (15) hinders the derivation of the optimum decision
fusion rule for large size networks. Specifically, the problem
with (13) and (15) is the exponential number of terms of the
summation over Ik (InB in (15)). In this section, we show that
an efficient implementation of such summations is possible
based on Dynamic Programming (DP) [20].
Dynamic programming is an optimization strategy which
allows to solve complex problems by transforming them into
subproblems and by taking advantage of the subproblems
overlap in order to reduce the number of operations . When
facing with complex recursive problems, by using dynamic
programming we solve each different subproblem only once by
storing the solution for subsequent use. If during the recursion
the same subproblem is encountered again, the problem is
not solved twice since its solution is already available. Such
a re-use of previously solved subproblems is often referred
in literature as memorization algorithm [20]. Intuitively, DP
allows to reduce the complexity of problems with a structure,
such that the solutions of the same subproblems can be reused
many times.
We now apply dynamic programming to reduce the com-
plexity of our problem. Let us focus on a fixed k (and n) and
6let us define the function fn,k as follows:
fn,k =
∑
I∈Ik
(∏
i∈I
(1− δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i)
∏
i∈I\I
(1− ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i)
)
. (16)
By focusing on node i, there are some configurations I ∈ Ik
for which such a node belongs to I , while for others the node
belongs to the complementary set I \ I . Let us define b(i) =
(1 − δ)meq(i)δm−meq(i) and h(i) = (1 − ε)meq(i)εm−meq(i),
which are the two contributions that node i can provide to
each term of the sum, depending on whether it belongs to I or
I \I . Let us focus on the first indexed node. By exploiting the
distributivity of the product with respect to the sum, expression
(16) can be rewritten in a recursive manner as:
fn,k = b(1)fn−1,k−1 + h(1)fn−1,k. (17)
By focusing on the second node, we can iterate on f(n −
1, k − 1) and f(n− 1, k), getting:
fn−1,k−1 = b(2)fn−2,k−2 + h(2)fn−2,k−1, (18)
and
fn−1,k = b(2)fn−2,k−1 + h(2)fn−2,k. (19)
We notice that the subfunction fn−2,k−1 appears in both
(18) and (19) and then it can be computed only once. The
procedure can be iterated for each subfunction until we reach
a subfunction whose value can be computed in closed form,
that is: fr,r =
∏n
i=n−r+1 b(i) and fr,0 =
∏n
i=n−r+1 h(i), for
some r ≤ k. By applying the memorization strategy typical of
dynamic programming, the number of required computations
is given by the number of nodes in the tree depicted in Figure
2, where the leaves correspond to the terms computable in
closed form4. By observing that the number of the nodes of
the tree is k(k+1)/2+k(n−k−k)+k(k+1)/2 = k(n−k+1),
we conclude that the number of operations is reduced from
(
n
k
)
to k(n− k+1), which corresponds to a quadratic complexity
instead of an exponential one.
IV. DECISION FUSION WITH BYZANTINES GAME
The optimum decision fusion rules derived in Section II
assume that the FC knows the attacking strategy adopted by
the Byzantines, which in the simplified case studied in this
paper corresponds to knowing Pmal. By knowing Pmal, in
fact, the FC can calculate the value of δ used in equations
(6), (11), (13) and (15), and hence implement the optimum
fusion rule. In previous works, as in [5], [21], it is often
conjectured that Pmal = 1. In some particular settings, as
the ones addressed in [15], [16], it has been shown that
this choice permits to the Byzantines to maximize the error
probability at the fusion center. Such an argument, however,
does not necessarily hold when the fusion center can localize
the byzantine nodes with good accuracy and when it knows
that the byzantine nodes always flip the local decision. In such
4The figure refers to the case k < n− k, which is always the case in our
setup since k < bn/2c.
fn−2,kfn−2,k−1fn−2,k−2
fn,k
fn−1,k−1 fn−1,k
fn−k,k
fn−k−1,kfn−k−1,k
fn−k,k−1
fk,0 fk,1 fk,kfk,k−1
fk−1,k−1fk−1,0
f0,0
fn−k,0 fn−k,1
fn−k−1,0 fn−k−1,1
Fig. 2: Efficient implementation of the function in (16) based
on dynamic programming. The figure depicts the tree with the
iterations for the case k < n− k.
a case, in fact, the FC can revert the action of the Byzantines
by simply inverting the reports received from such nodes, as
it is implicitly done by the optimal fusion rules derived in the
previous section. In such a situation, it is easy to argue that
it is better for the Byzantines to let Pmal = 0.5 since in this
way the mutual information between the system status and the
reports received from the byzantine nodes is equal to zero. In
general, the byzantine nodes must face the following dilemma:
is it better to try to force the FC to make a wrong decision by
letting Pmal = 1 and run the risk that if their location in the
network is detected the FC receives some useful information
from the corrupted reports, or erase the information that the
FC receives from the attacked nodes by reducing to zero the
mutual information between the corrupted reports and Sm ?
Given the above discussion, it is clear that the FC can not
assume that the Byzantines use Pmal = 1, hence making the
actual implementation of the optimum decision fusion rule
impossible.
In order to exit this apparent deadlock, we propose to model
the struggle between the Byzantines and the FC as a two-
player, zero-sum, strategic game, whose equilibrium defines
the optimum choices for the FC and the Byzantines.
A. Game theory in a nutshell
A 2-player game is defined as a 4-uple G(S1,S2, v1, v2),
where S1 = {z1,1 . . . z1,n1} and S2 = {z2,1 . . . z2,n2} are
the set of actions (usually called strategies) the first and the
second player can choose from, and vl(z1,i, z2,j), l = 1, 2,
is the payoff of the game for player l, when the first player
chooses the strategy z1,i and the second chooses z2,j . A pair of
7strategies (z1,i, z2,j) is called a profile. When v1(z1,i, z2,j) +
v2(z1,i, z2,j) = 0, the game is said to be a zero-sum game.
In the set-up adopted in this paper, S1, S2 and the payoff
functions are assumed to be known to the two players. In
addition, we assume that the players choose their strategies
before starting the game without knowing the strategy chosen
by the other player (strategic game).
A common goal in game theory is to determine the existence
of equilibrium points, i.e. profiles that in some way represent
a satisfactory choice for both players [22]. The most famous
equilibrium notion is due to Nash. Intuitively, a profile is a
Nash equilibrium if each player does not have any interest in
changing his choice assuming the other does not change his
strategy. For the particular case of a 2-player game, a profile
(z1,i∗ , z2,j∗) is a Nash equilibrium if:
v1((z1,i∗ , z2,j∗)) ≥ v1((z1,i, z2,j∗)) ∀z1,i ∈ S1
v2((z1,i∗ , z2,j∗)) ≥ v2((z1,i∗ , z2,j)) ∀z2,j ∈ S2, (20)
where for a zero-sum game v2 = −v1.
A stronger equilibrium notion is that of dominant equi-
librium. A strategy is said to be strictly dominant for one
player if it is the best strategy for the player, regardless of the
strategy chosen by the other player. In many cases dominant
strategies do not exist, however when one such strategy exists
for one of the players, he will surely adopt it (at least under the
assumption of rational behavior). The other players, in turn,
will choose their strategies anticipating that the first player
will play the dominant strategy. As a consequence, in a two-
player game, if a dominant strategy exists the players have only
one rational choice called the only rationalizable equilibrium
of the game [23]. Games with the above property are called
dominance solvable games.
The above definition assumes that the players determinis-
tically choose one of the strategies in Si (pure strategy). A
more flexible approach consists in letting each player choose
a strategy with a certain probability. In this way, we introduce
a new game in which the strategies available to the players are
probability distributions over Si’s. The payoff is redefined as
the average payoff under the probability distributions chosen
by the players. A probability distribution over Si’s is said a
mixed strategy for player i. A central result of game theory
[24] states that if we allow mixed strategies, then every game
with a finite number of players and with a finite number
of pure strategies for each player has at least one Nash
equilibrium.
As anticipated, we model the interplay between the value of
Pmal adopted by the Byzantines and the value used by the FC
in its attempt to implement the optimum fusion rule as game.
For sake of clarity, in the following we indicate the flipping
probability adopted by the Byzantines as PBmal, while we use
the symbol PFCmal to indicate the value adopted by the FC in
its implementation of the optimum fusion rule. With the above
ideas in mind, we introduce the Decision Fusion Game.
Definition 1. The DFByz(SB ,SFC , v) game is a two player,
zero-sum, strategic, game played by the FC and the Byzan-
tines (collectively acting as a single player), defined by the
following strategies and payoff.
• The sets of strategies the Byzantines and the FC can
choose from are, respectively, the set of possible values
of PBmal and P
FC
mal:
SB = {PBmal ∈ [0, 1]};
SFC = {PFCmal ∈ [0, 1]}. (21)
• The payoff function is defined as the error probability
at the FC, hereafter indicated as Pe. Of course the
Byzantines aim at maximizing Pe, while the FC aims at
minimizing it.
Note that according to the definition of DFByz , the sets
of strategies available to the FC and the Byzantines are
continuous sets. In practice, however, continuous values can
be replaced by a properly quantized version of PBmal and P
FC
mal.
In the next section, we use numerical simulations to derive
the equilibrium point of various versions of the game obtained
by varying the probability distribution of byzantine nodes as
detailed in Section II. As we will see, while some versions of
the game has a unique Nash (or even dominant) equilibrium
point in pure strategies, in other cases, a Nash equilibrium
exists only in mixed strategies.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
In order to investigate the behavior of the DFByz game for
different setups and analyze the achievable performance when
the FC adopts the optimum decision strategy with parameters
tuned following a game-theoretic approach, we run extensive
numerical simulations. The first goal of the simulations was to
study the existence of an equilibrium point in pure or mixed
strategies, and analyze the expected behavior of the FC and
the Byzantines at the equilibrium. The second goal was to
evaluate the payoff at the equilibrium as a measure of the best
achievable performance of Decision Fusion in the presence
of Byzantines. We then used such a value to compare the
performance of the game-theoretic approach proposed in this
paper with respect to previous works.
A. Analysis of the equilibrium point of the DFByz game
As we said, the first goal of the simulations was to determine
the existence of an equilibrium point for the DFByz game. To
do so we quantized the set of available strategies considering
the following set of values: PBmal ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}
and PFCmal ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1}. We restricted our anal-
ysis to values larger than or equal to 0.5 since it is easily
arguable that such values always lead to better performance
for the Byzantines5 (in fact, when PBmal = 0.5 the mutual
information between the system state and the reports sent to
the FC is equal to zero). As to the choice of the quantization
step, we set it to 0.1 to ease the description of the results we
have got and speed up the simulations. Some exploratory test
made with a smaller step gave similar results. We found that
among all the parameters of the game, the value of m has a
major impact on the equilibrium point. The value of m, in
5By using a game-theoretic terminology, this is equivalent to say that the
strategies corresponding to PBmal < 0.5 are dominated strategies and hence
can be eliminated.
8fact, determines the ease with which the FC can localize the
byzantine nodes, and hence plays a major role in determining
the optimum attacking strategy for the Byzantines. For this
reason, we split our analysis in two parts: the former refers
to small values of m, the latter to medium values of m.
Unfortunately, the exponential growth of the complexity of the
optimum decision fusion rule as a function of m prevented us
from running simulations with large values of m.
We run simulations to evaluate the payoff matrix of the
game between the Byzantines and the FC. To do so, we run
50,000 trials to compute the Pe at each row of the matrix. In
particular, for each PBmal, we used the same 50,000 states to
compute the Pe for all PFCmal strategies. In all the simulations,
we let PSj (0) = PSj (1) = 0.5, n = 20, and ε = 0.1.
1) Small m: For the first set of simulations, we used a
rather low value of m, namely m = 4. The other parameters
of the game we set as follows: n = 20, ε = 0.1. With regard
to the number of byzantine nodes present in the network we
used α = {0.3, 0.4, 0.45} for the case of independent node
states studied in Section II-B1, and nB = {6, 8, 9} for the case
of known number of Byzantines (Section II-C). Such values
were chosen so that in both cases we have the same average
number of Byzantines, thus easing the comparing between the
two settings.
Tables I through III report the payoff for all the profiles
resulting from the quantized values of PBmal and P
FC
mal, for
the case of independent node states (constrained maximum
entropy distribution). In all the cases PBmal = 1 is a dominant
strategy for the Byzantines, and the profile (1, 1) is the unique
rationalizable equilibrium of the game. As expected, the error
probability increases with the number of Byzantines.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.845 0.965 1.1 1.3 1.6 2.1
0.6 1.2 1.1 1.2 1.5e-3 1.8 2.6
0.7 2.2 2.0 1.8 1.8e-3 2.1 3.7
0.8 5.4 5.1 5.0 5.0e-3 5.1 7.7
0.9 16.2 16.1 16.5 16.4 16.0 19.1
1.0 43 43.1 46.9 46.8 41.6 34.9
TABLE I: Payoff of the DFByz game (103 × Pe) with
independent node states with α = 0.3, m = 4, n = 20,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.33 0.37 0.44 0.58 0.73 0.85
0.6 0.60 0.54 0.59 0.70 0.80 1.14
0.7 1.38 1.20 1.19 1.24 1.29 2.40
0.8 3.88 3.56 3.36 3.31 3.35 6.03
0.9 9.93 9.61 9.57 9.55 9.54 11.96
1.0 20.33 20.98 21.70 21.90 21.84 19.19
TABLE II: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
independent node states with α = 0.4, m = 4, n = 20,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
Tables IV through VI report the payoffs for the case of fixed
number of Byzantines, respectively equal to 6, 8 and 9.
When nB = 6, PBmal = 0.5 is a dominant strategy for
the Byzantines, and the profile (0.5, 0.5) is the unique ratio-
nalizable equilibrium of the game. This marks a significant
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.62 0.69 0.86 1.34 1.70 1.57
0.6 1.23 1.15 1.26 1.84 2.18 2.38
0.7 2.94 2.64 2.57 3.00 3.14 5.33
0.8 7.89 7.39 7.03 6.74 6.81 12.73
0.9 18.45 17.94 17.63 17.08 17.07 22.78
1.0 34.39 34.62 34.84 36.66 36.61 33.14
TABLE III: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
independent node states with α = 0.45, m = 4, n = 20,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 3.80 3.80 4.60 7.60 12.0 29.0
0.6 3.60 3.45 3.90 5.20 8.0 17.0
0.7 3.45 2.80 2.80 3.10 4.40 8.75
0.8 4.10 2.85 2.15 2.05 2.25 3.25
0.9 3.55 2.05 1.40 0.95 0.70 0.75
1.0 2.05 0.90 0.35 0.15 0.05 0.05
TABLE IV: Payoff of the DFByz game (104 × Pe) with
nB = 6, m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point
is highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 1.2 1.4 1.9 3.1 6.3 18.9
0.6 1.5 1.4 1.4 2.0 3.7 10.0
0.7 1.4 1.1 0.945 1.1 1.7 4.0
0.8 1.4 0.95 0.715 0.58 0.675 1.2
0.9 2.1 1.4 0.995 0.745 0.71 0.78
1.0 7.3 5.7 5.3 3.7 3.0 2.9
TABLE V: Payoff of the DFByz game (103×Pe) with nB = 8,
m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1. No pure strategy equilibrium exists.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.22 0.24 0.33 0.63 1.41 4.13
0.6 0.27 0.24 0.27 0.41 0.78 2.03
0.7 0.32 0.24 0.23 0.26 0.37 0.82
0.8 0.54 0.45 0.39 0.36 0.41 0.59
0.9 2.04 1.87 1.76 1.58 1.56 1.66
1.0 9.48 8.76 8.37 6.72 5.88 5.51
TABLE VI: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
nB = 9, m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point
is highlighted in bold.
difference with respect to the case of independent nodes,
where the optimum strategy for the Byzantines was to let
PBmal = 1. The reason behind the different behavior is that
in the case of fixed number of nodes, the a-priori knowledge
available at the FC is larger than in the case of independent
nodes with the same average number of nodes. This additional
information permits to the FC to localize the byzantine nodes,
which now can not use PBmal = 1, since in this case they
would still transmit some useful information to the FC. On
the contrary, by letting PBmal = 0.5 the information received
from the byzantine nodes is zero, hence making the task of
the FC harder. When nB = 9 (Table VI), the larger number of
Byzantines makes the identification of malicious nodes more
difficult and PBmal = 1 is again a dominant strategy, with
the equilibrium of the game obtained at the profile (1,1). A
somewhat intermediate situation is observed when nB = 8
(Table V). In this case, no equilibrium point exists (let alone
9a dominant strategy) if we consider pure strategies only. On
the other hand, when mixed strategies are considered, the
game has a unique Nash equilibrium for the strategies reported
in Table VII (each row in the table gives the probability
vector assigned to the quantized values of Pmal by one of
the players at the equilibrium). Interestingly the optimum
strategy of the Byzantines corresponds to alternate playing
PBmal = 1 and P
B
mal = 0.5, with intermediate probabilities.
This confirms the necessity for the Byzantines to find a good
trade-off between two alternative strategies: set to zero the
information transmitted to the FC or try to push it towards a
wrong decision. We also observe that the error probabilities
at the equilibrium are always lower than those of the game
with independent nodes. This is an expected result, since in
the case of fixed nodes the FC has a better knowledge about
the distribution of byzantine nodes.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
P (PBmal) 0.179 0 0 0 0 0.821
P (PFCmal) 0 0 0 0.844 0.156 0
P ∗e = 3.8e− 4
TABLE VII: Mixed equilibrium point for the DFByz game
with nB = 8, m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1. P ∗e indicates the error
probability at the equilibrium.
The last case we have analyzed corresponds to a situation
in which the FC knows only that the number of Byzantines
is lower than n/2 (see Sec. II-B2). The payoff for this
instantiation of the DFByz game is given in Table VIII. In
order to compare the results of this case with those obtained
for the case of independent nodes and that of fixed number of
Byzantines, we observe that when all the sequences an with
nB < n/2 have the same probability, the average number of
Byzantines turns out to be 7.86. The most similar settings,
then, are that of independent nodes with α = 0.4 and that
of fixed number of nodes with nB = 8. With respect to the
former, the error probability at the equilibrium is significantly
smaller, thus confirming the case of independent nodes as the
worst scenario for the FC. This is due to the fact that with
α = 0.4 it is rather likely that number of Byzantines is larger
than 0.5 this making any reliable decision impossible. The
error probability obtained with a fixed number of Byzantines
equal to 8, however, is much lower. This is a reasonable result,
since in that case the a priori information available to the FC
permits a better localization of the corrupted reports.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.15 0.17 0.20 0.29 0.39 0.51
0.6 0.17 0.16 0.16 0.22 0.29 0.40
0.7 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.20 0.30
0.8 0.27 0.20 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.22
0.9 0.85 0.76 0.72 0.63 0.58 0.63
1.0 3.81 3.49 3.30 2.62 2.24 2.13
TABLE VIII: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
NB < n/2. The other parameters of the game are set as
follows: m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point
is highlighted in bold.
2) Medium values of m: In this section we report the
results that we got when the length of the observation vector
increases. We expect that by comparing the reports sent by
the nodes corresponding to different components of the state
vector allows a better identification of the byzantine nodes,
thus modifying the equilibrium of the game. Specifically, we
repeated the simulations carried out in the previous section, by
letting m = 10. Though desirable, repeating the simulations
with even larger values of m is not possible due to the
exponential growth of the complexity of the optimum fusion
rule with m.
Tables IX through XI report the payoffs of the game for the
case of independent node states. As it can be seen, PBmal =
1.0 is still a dominant strategy for the Byzantines and the
profile (1,1) is the unique rationalizable equilibrium of the
game. Moreover, the value of Pe at the equilibrium is slightly
lower than for m = 4, when α = 0.3 and α = 0.4 (see Tables
I and II). Such an advantage disappears when α = 0.45 (see
Table III), since the number of Byzantines is so large that
identifying them is difficult even with m = 10.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.258 0.28 0.39 0.63 1.0 1.7
0.6 0.28 0.226 0.248 0.362 0.652 2.0
0.7 0.346 0.22 0.206 0.23 0.314 5.3
0.8 1.2 0.648 0.44 0.428 0.498 13.9
0.9 8.6 7.8 7.6 7.8 7.5 19.9
1.0 41.9 46.7 50.9 59.8 52.2 32.9
TABLE IX: Payoff of the DFByz game (103 × Pe) with
independent node states with α = 0.3, m = 10, n = 20,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.11 0.13 0.19 0.73 2.16 0.68
0.6 0.11 8.32e-2 9.96e-2 0.26 0.67 1.30
0.7 0.18 7.66e-2 6.62e-2 9.52e-2 0.18 4.87
0.8 1.10 0.60 0.33 0.24 0.28 10.41
0.9 5.77 4.75 3.95 3.53 3.41 13.44
1.0 20.41 21.26 22.65 24.27 26.21 18.72
TABLE X: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
independent node states with m = 10, n = 20, α = 0.4,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 0.20 0.23 0.47 2.88 10.92 1.26
0.6 0.22 0.18 0.24 0.80 2.85 2.93
0.7 0.50 0.19 0.15 0.23 0.65 10.64
0.8 2.61 1.24 0.63 0.41 0.59 20.65
0.9 11.74 9.28 7.08 5.65 5.21 25.85
1.0 34.25 34.94 36.01 37.74 39.87 33.17
TABLE XI: Payoff of the DFByz game (102 × Pe) with
independent node states with α = 0.45, m = 10, n = 20,
ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is highlighted in bold.
The results of the simulations for the case of fixed number
of nodes are given in Tables XII through XIV. With respect to
the case of m = 4, the optimum strategy for the Byzantines
shifts to PBmal = 0.5. When nB = 6, P
B
mal = 0.5 is a dominant
strategy, while for nB = 8 and nB = 9, no equilibrium point
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exists if we consider only pure strategies. The mixed strategy
equilibrium point for these cases is given in Tables XVI and
XVII. By comparing those tables with those of the case m = 4,
the preference towards PBmal = 0.5 is evident.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 1.22 1.22 1.40 2.20 5.06 11.0
0.6 1.12 0.94 1.02 1.26 2.56 5.34
0.7 1.22 0.58 0.56 0.64 0.98 2.06
0.8 1.22 0.36 0.32 0.28 0.30 0.56
0.9 1.40 0.20 0.18 0.16 0.10 0.18
1.0 1.52 0.14 0.14 0.10 6e-2 4e-2
TABLE XII: Payoff of the DFByz game (104 × Pe) with
nB = 6, m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. The equilibrium point is
highlighted in bold.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 4.04 4.44 6.24 10.0 24.0 71.0
0.6 4.02 3.30 3.58 5.24 10.0 26.0
0.7 3.48 2.16 2.14 2.16 3.26 7.76
0.8 3.56 1.10 0.88 0.78 0.98 2.08
0.9 4.60 0.68 0.54 0.30 0.26 0.44
1.0 5.20 0.54 0.20 8e-2 0 0
TABLE XIII: Payoff of the DFByz game (104×Pe) with nB =
8, m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. No pure strategy equilibrium
exists.
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 6.74 7.82 12 23 52 168
0.6 5.44 4.94 6.14 9.40 18 52
0.7 4.22 3.30 2.78 3.38 5.86 15
0.8 3.0 2.24 1.24 0.78 1.32 3.24
0.9 5.22 2.36 1.34 1.02 0.88 1.24
1.0 70 40 19 8.90 3.44 2.42
TABLE XIV: Payoff of the DFByz game (104 × Pe) with
nB = 9, m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. No pure strategy
equilibrium exists.
Eventually, Table XV, gives the results for the case NB <
n/2. As in the case of fixed number of Byzantines, the
equilibrium point strategy passes from the pure strategy (1,1)
to a mixed strategy (see Table XVIII). Once again, the reason
for such a behavior, is that when m increase, the amount
of information available to the FC increases, hence making
the detection of corrupted reports easier. As a result, the
Byzantines must find a trade-off between forcing a wrong
decision and reducing the mutual information between the
corrupted reports and system states.
We conclude observing that even with m = 10, the case of
independent nodes results in the worst performance.
B. Performance at the equilibrium and comparison with prior
works
As a last analysis we compare the error probability obtained
by game-theoretic optimum decision fusion introduced in this
paper, with those obtained by previous solutions. Specifically,
we compare our scheme against a simple majority-based
decision fusion rule according to which the FC decides that
PBmal /P
FC
mal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
0.5 4.46 5.38 6.64 9.88 16 27
0.6 3.90 3.38 4.10 5.90 9.42 19
0.7 3.04 2.24 1.82 2.26 3.68 7.28
0.8 2.78 1.72 1.0 0.72 0.90 1.70
0.9 3.24 1.38 0.62 0.30 0.20 0.48
1.0 27 15 6.84 4.68 1.42 1.04
TABLE XV: Payoff of the DFByz game (104×Pe) with NB <
n/2. The other parameters of the game are set as follows:
m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. No pure strategy equilibrium
exists.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
P (PBmal) 0.921 0 0 0 0 0.079
P (PFCmal) 0.771 0.229 0 0 0 0
P ∗e = 4.13e− 4
TABLE XVI: Mixed equilibrium point for the DFByz game
with nB = 8, m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. P ∗e indicates the
error probability at the equilibrium.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
P (PBmal) 0.4995 0 0 0 0 0.5005
P (PFCmal) 0 0 0.66 0.34 0 0
P ∗e = 1.58e− 3
TABLE XVII: Mixed equilibrium point for the DFByz game
with nB = 9, m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. P ∗e indicates the
error probability at the equilibrium.
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
P (PBmal) 0.4 0 0 0 0 0.6
P (PFCmal) 0 0 0.96 0.04 0 0
P ∗e = 6.76e− 4
TABLE XVIII: Mixed equilibrium point for the DFByz game
with NB < n/2 with m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1. P ∗e indicates
the error probability at the equilibrium.
sj = 1 if and only if
∑
i rij > n/2 (Maj), against the
hard isolation scheme described in [5] (HardIS), and the soft
isolation scheme proposed in [15] (SoftIS).
In order to carry out a fair comparison and to take into
account the game-theoretic nature of the problem, the perfor-
mance of all the schemes are evaluated at the equilibrium.
For the HardIS and SoftIS schemes this corresponds to letting
PBmal = 1. In fact, in [15], it is shown that this is a dom-
inant strategy for these two specific fusion schemes. As a
consequence, PFCmal is also set to 1, since the FC knows in
advance that the Byzantines will play the dominant strategy.
For the Maj fusion strategy, the FC has no degrees of freedom,
so no game actually exists in this case. With regard to the
Byzantines, it is easy to realize that the best strategy is to
let PBmal = 1. When the equilibrium corresponds to a mixed
strategy, the error probability is averaged according to the
mixed strategies at the equilibrium. Tables XIX and XX show
the error probability at the equilibrium for the tested systems
under different setups. As it can be seen, the fusion scheme
resulting for the application of the optimum fusion rule in a
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game-theoretic setting, consistently provides better results for
all the analyzed cases. Expectedly, the improvement is more
significant for the setups in which the FC has more information
about the distribution of the Byzantines across the network.
Maj HardIS SoftIS OPT
Independent nodes, α = 0.3 0.073 0.048 0.041 0.035
Independent nodes, α = 0.4 0.239 0.211 0.201 0.192
Independent nodes, α = 0.45 0.362 0.344 0.338 0.331
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 6 0.017 0.002 6.2e-4 3.8e-4
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 8 0.125 0.044 0.016 0.004
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 9 0.279 0.186 0.125 0.055
Max entropy with NB < n/2 0.154 0.086 0.052 0.021
TABLE XIX: Error probability at the equilibrium for various
fusion schemes. All the results have been obtained by letting
m = 4, n = 20, ε = 0.1.
Maj HardIS SoftIS OPT
Independent nodes, α = 0.3 0.073 0.0364 0.0346 0.033
Independent nodes, α = 0.4 0.239 0.193 0.19 0.187
Independent nodes, α = 0.45 0.363 0.334 0.333 0.331
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 6 0.016 1.53e-4 1.41e-4 1.22e-4
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 8 0.126 0.0028 9.68e-4 4.13e-4
Fixed n. of nodes nB = 9 0.279 0.0703 0.0372 1.58e-3
Max entropy with NB < n/2 0.154 0.0271 0.0141 6.8e-4
TABLE XX: Error probability at the equilibrium for various
fusion schemes. All the results have been obtained by letting
m = 10, n = 20, ε = 0.1.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
We have studied the problem of decision fusion in multi-
sensor networks in the presence of Byzantines. We first derived
the optimum decision strategy by assuming that the statistical
behavior of the Byzantines is known. Then we relaxed such
an assumption by casting the problem into a game-theoretic
framework in which the FC tries to guess the behavior of the
Byzantines. The Byzantines, in turn, must fix their corruption
strategy without knowing the guess made by the FC. We
considered several versions of the game with different distri-
butions of the Byzantines across the network. Specifically, we
considered three setups: unconstrained maximum entropy dis-
tribution, constrained maximum entropy distribution and fixed
number of Byzantines. In order to reduce the computational
complexity of the optimum fusion rule for large network sizes,
we proposed an efficient implementation based on dynamic
programming. Simulation results show that increasing the
observation window m leads to better identification of the
Byzantines at the FC. This forces the Byzantines to look for
a trade-off between forcing the FC to make a wrong decision
on one hand, and reducing the mutual information between
the reports and the system state on the other hand. Simulation
results confirm that, in all the analyzed cases, the performance
at the equilibrium are superior to those obtained by previously
proposed techniques. About the future work, an interesting
possibility is to enhance the Byzantines performance by grant-
ing them access to the observation vectors. In this way, they
can focus their attack on the most uncertain cases thus avoiding
to flip the local decision when it is expected that the attack
will have no effect on the FC decision. Considering a case
where the node can send more extensive reports rather than
one single bit is another interesting possibility. Finally, a
motivating direction for future research is to investigate the
adversarial decision fusion in a distributed scenario.
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